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  Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.1
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
             
No. 05-5330
             
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHAWN ROBINSON,
Appellant
             
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 04-cr-00421)  
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
             
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
 February 27, 2007
Before: McKEE, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,  Judge1
(Filed:March 5, 2007)
             
2OPINION OF THE COURT
             
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
On May 4, 2005, Shawn Robinson pleaded guilty to 10 counts of cocaine
possession with the intent to distribute.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).   The
District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Robinson to 150 months’
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  Robinson now appeals his punishment.
He contends that the use of hearsay evidence at his sentencing hearing violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront his accusers.  We conclude that Appellant’s argument lacks
merit and, accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
The parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings, so we will only briefly
revisit them here.  During a 10-month police investigation in Penns Grove, New Jersey,
Robinson sold undercover informants approximately 167 grams of cocaine and 62 grams
of crack cocaine.  Robinson was subsequently arrested and charged with a twelve-count
indictment.  In May of 2005, he signed a plea agreement; the government dropped two
charges of crack cocaine possession and Robinson pled guilty to 10 counts of cocaine
possession with intent to distribute.  
At the sentencing hearing, to the surprise of the prosecutor, Robinson claimed that
he was set up by the government.  He insisted that he only sold drugs to the undercover
3informant, and only as a result of the informant’s prodding.  To rebut this contention,
Sergeant Brian Facemyer of the Salem County Narcotics Task Force presented hearsay
testimony that Robinson sold drugs to at least seven different buyers.  Facemyer
explained that seven of Robinson’s regular customers provided taped, sworn statements
admitting that they had purchased cocaine from Robinson.  Based on their admissions, six
of the buyers then pleaded guilty to drug-related offenses.  
Concerned about his credibility, Robinson challenged the introduction of
Facemyer’s hearsay testimony.  Appellant argued that under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause he had the right to cross-examine the seven individuals who
accused him of dealing cocaine.  The Confrontation Clause guarantees that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  To support his position, Robinson cited
Crawford v. Washington, a Supreme Court case that examines the Sixth Amendment right
to confront accusers at trial. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  The District Court rejected Appellant’s
argument and considered Facemyer’s testimony in fashioning Robinson’s sentence.
Robinson now appeals.
II.
This case asks us to decide if the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
prevents the government from introducing hearsay evidence during sentencing hearings. 
Put another way: do criminal defendants have the right to cross-examine out-of-court
  We also note that none of our sister Courts of Appeals have interpreted Crawford to2
apply to sentencing hearings. See United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d
614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2005).
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witnesses during the sentencing phase?  The law on this issue is well settled.  Both the
Supreme Court and this Court of Appeals have determined that the Confrontation Clause
does not apply in the sentencing context and does not prevent the introduction of hearsay
testimony at a sentencing hearing.  See Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959);
United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099-1100 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause only applies at trial, not sentencing). 
Robinson makes a valiant attempt to outflank the clear precedent of this Court.  He
argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington mandates
that we reevaluate how the Sixth Amendment applies to sentencing. We disagree.  In
Crawford, the Supreme Court held that in a criminal trial the Confrontation Clause
prohibits consideration of out-of-court testimonial statements, unless the witness is
unavailable and the defendant has had a previous opportunity to conduct cross-
examination.  541 U.S. at 68.  Crawford, however, never applies its rule to sentencing;
nowhere does the decision refer to sentencing hearings.  Crawford, therefore, provides no
platform to reverse prior Supreme Court decisions that expressly allow the introduction of
hearsay evidence in the sentencing context.   2
Prosecutors, of course, may not introduce any and all hearsay testimony at a
sentencing proceeding.  The admission of hearsay statements in the sentencing context is
subject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause.  Under the precedent of this Court,
hearsay statements must have some “minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere
allegation.”  Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1102 (citations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. §
6A1.3(a) (courts may consider any evidence at sentencing “provided that the information
has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”).  The evidence
offered by the Government through the testimony of Sergeant Facemyer easily passes this
test.  The District Court noted that Facemyer’s testimony was supported by audiotapes of
Robinson talking with his buyers and taped sworn statements of those buyers admitting
they purchased cocaine from Robinson on multiple occasions.  Considering the footprint
left by this evidence, the District Court’s decision to allow the hearsay testimony was
warranted.  Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court. 
* * * * * *
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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